

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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OF THE COMMITTEE

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 31 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M.T. MBU

(Nigeria)

62-21768

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
 Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
 Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
 Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
 Mr. G. GUELEV
 Mr. M. KIRASSIEONOV
 Mr. V. IZMIRIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
 U. MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
 Mr. S.F. RAE
 Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
 Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
 Mr. M. ZEMLA
 Mr. V. TYLNER
 Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
 ATO M. HAMID
 ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
 Mr. A.S. MEHTA
 Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
 Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
 Mr. A. CAGIATI
 Mr. C. COSTA-BEGHINI
 Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBODYCZ
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVITCH
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GOEBER
Sir MICHAEL WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the seventy-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers the names of the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Sweden, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, Burma, Canada, Ethiopia, India and Mexico.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman. You have just read out a list of twelve speakers, and it seems obvious that if our discussion proceeds at the normal pace we shall not be able to speak for as long as usual. As the arrangement is that our meetings should end at about 1 p.m. I should like to propose, for your consideration and for the consideration of the Committee, that if by 1 p.m. today we have not heard all the speakers whose names are now inscribed the list should be carried over to a meeting this afternoon in order that all those who have inscribed their names should have the opportunity to speak.

There are only four meetings remaining, including this one, before we recess, and I think that nearly every delegation here will have important statements to make which it will wish to appear on the record. Some delegations may wish to speak more than once. Accordingly, it seems obvious that we shall not be able in those four remaining meetings to hear everyone who wishes to speak.

I think, therefore, that it would be better to conclude the list of speakers each day, rather than to carry over speakers to the ensuing meeting as we have done in the past. I understand that there is a long list of speakers for Monday also. So I propose that at 1 p.m. today we should consider the situation, and that unless it then appears that we could finish in twenty minutes or half an hour we should meet again at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): It has been proposed by the representative of Canada that, in view of the long list of speakers who have inscribed their names for today, we might consider meeting at three o'clock this afternoon if at 1 p.m. we have not exhausted the list of speakers. The Committee may wish to express an opinion on this. If it is the wish of the Committee that we should meet at 3 p.m., the Committee may so decide.

Mr. LALL (India): May I suggest that we take a decision on this matter at a quarter to one. Since we have already made other arrangements for this afternoon it might be difficult to meet again today, although of course we might consider it for another day. This is rather unexpected. Of course we give first priority to this work. However, if we proceed now and see how the situation appears a little later in the morning, we may see whether we should hold a meeting today, tomorrow or some other day.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I should like to support the suggestions of the representative of Canada. I quite understand the difficulties to which the representative of India refers. We all have fairly full programmes, and I realize that, but I should have thought it might be a greater inconvenience if we were to leave it over. If we could have met this afternoon, if only for a fairly short time, perhaps one and a half or two hours at most, we might at least have hoped to catch up with a good deal of the backlog, but, if we were to contemplate meeting tomorrow, as I think the representative of India suggested, that might be even more inconvenient than meeting this afternoon. With everybody wishing to speak, we are in this difficulty. I should have thought, on balance, that probably we ought to try to meet this afternoon, if it could be arranged and if the need is shown, as I think the list of speakers in fact does clearly indicate it will be shown.

Mr. TIRABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The Canadian representative's proposal contained a subsidiary proposal to the effect that we should discuss the possibility of a second meeting shortly before the end of the present meeting, which was echoed by the opinion expressed by the Indian representative. Nobody, I think, wishes to oppose this sub-proposal of the Canadian representative.

I request, therefore, that this question should not be discussed now but that we should discuss it when we can see whether we can get to the end of our list of speakers. That should be about one o'clock or half-past one. I do not think we need discuss it any more just now.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I take it to be the consensus that we should proceed with our discussion and interrupt our proceedings at one o'clock to decide whether or not we should have another meeting this afternoon.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The subject now under discussion in the Committee, namely, disarmament measures concerning conventional weapons and particularly the production of these weapons and appropriate control measures, is certainly important in itself, for conventional weapons continue to be an important factor in national armed forces. The bulk of present-day armies are still equipped with these weapons. But at the present time, conventional weapons, though an important element, are supplementary to the nuclear striking force at the disposal of the great Powers. However, in the circumstances characterized by the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles and, hence, the immobilization of nuclear weapons in the first stage, as envisaged in the Soviet draft, conventional weapons once more become an important factor in the strategy of all States.

It is against this background that one must study the reduction of conventional weapons and their manufacture and the relevant control measures, as has in fact been done by a number of representatives. Thanks to the concessions made by the Soviet Union concerning the working out of certain measures on which the Western countries were particularly insistent, the positions reflected in the two drafts - that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States - have moved a good deal closer together on the question of the reduction of conventional weapons. They are now so close together that it will not be impossible to arrive at a mutually acceptable text for the future treaty on the question of the reduction of conventional weapons in the first stage. It is true that there are still considerable differences on certain points, for example, on whether reduction of conventional weapons should cover all types without exception, as is contemplated in the Soviet draft, or whether only some types of weapon should be reduced, as is proposed in the United States draft. I might remark in passing that the United States proposal on this point conflicts with the basic principle which that country claims to have followed in preparing its draft, namely that of an across-the-board reduction of all weapons. Moreover, this principle of uniform reduction which the United States delegation has stressed so often during our discussions, is not only not applied to all types of conventional weapon, but is not applied to nuclear weapons either.

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These are the points which we have to consider at the present stage of our discussions on the question of reducing conventional weapons during the first stage; they show that the principle on which the United States plan is allegedly based is not applied with regard to certain categories of weapons which are very important or which, in certain circumstances, may become very important.

However important it may be, the question of the reduction of conventional weapons cannot be treated in isolation and considered apart from the aggregate of the disarmament measures which should be taken during the first stage of general and complete disarmament. If disarmament were carried out according to the proposals of the Soviet draft treaty, the reduction of conventional weapons would, no doubt, be of considerable importance, for it is precisely these armaments which would still be operational, at the disposal of national armies.

If, however, disarmament were carried out according to the United States draft, the 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons would be practically insignificant. We should not forget that the entire power of the conventional weapons at present in national arsenals is but an infinitesimal part of the total destructive power of the nuclear weapons at the disposal of States. An idea of the disproportion between the destructive power of nuclear weapons and that of conventional weapons was given to us by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, who on 15 March stated:

"Modern weapons have a quality new to history. A single thermo-nuclear weapon today can carry the explosive power of all the weapons of the last war". (ENDC/PV.2, p.17)

By the last war he meant, of course, the Second World War.

During the discussion of general and complete disarmament, and also of special questions which have come up on our Committee's agenda, the United States delegation has upheld the view that in the field of armaments, there existed a twilight zone where it was impossible to distinguish between nuclear weapon vehicles and conventional weapons. Only the other day, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, speaking on the question of the reduction of conventional weapons in the first stage of disarmament, said:

"We have shown during our discussions that modern technology has made possible the delivery of either a nuclear or a conventional weapon by virtually all of

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the delivery vehicles which are set forth illustratively in the stage I categories of the United States treaty outline (ENDC/30, section A, pp.4-5)".
(ENDC/PV.74, p.44)

He was speaking, of course, of weapons regarded as conventional by the United States.

Furthermore, it has been several times asserted by United States experts and statesmen that in the United States Army there is practically no difference of status between the tactical nuclear weapons and the conventional weapons with which it is equipped.

The former President of the United States, General Eisenhower, said at the eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1953:

"In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services."^{1/}

There is no doubt that since then the number and variety of these nuclear weapons in the armed forces of the great Powers which have sought to introduce them have increased considerably, thus reinforcing their conventional status in those armies which seek to introduce them as conventional types of weapon.

If that is so - and I am sure that nobody here doubts it - the reduction of 30 per cent in conventional weapons, though it may appear a high percentage, would not be equivalent to a reduction of even, say, 1 per cent of the nuclear weapons which are becoming conventional. In other words, a 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons could easily be compensated for by 1 per cent (I am using this percentage illustratively, as the actual percentage would probably be far lower) of nuclear weapons retained in national arsenals which, according to the statements cited, are capable of becoming conventional weapons.

To sum up, while the nuclear threat hangs over all mankind - which according to the United States draft, is still the case after the first stage when 70 per cent of nuclear weapon vehicles would remain in national arsenals, enough, according to

^{1/}(Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 470th meeting, para. 89)

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certain experts, to destroy the whole world several times over - I repeat: while the nuclear threat is still imminent, the 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons represents in effect a fictitious measure of disarmament. It would always be possible, if necessary, to employ tactical nuclear weapons to supplement the conventional power at the disposal of armed forces.

A 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons would only be effective and significant if the Soviet draft treaty were carried out, according to which nuclear weapons, neutralized in the first stage, would have become a deadweight, unable to be really used by the States.

It has often been said by the United States delegation and by other western delegations that it would be practically impossible to distinguish between nuclear and conventional weapons and that therefore the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles as proposed in the Soviet draft could not take place. I should like to stress that, if the sole obstacle to the abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles consists of difficulties of this sort, such difficulties are easily overcome. The important thing is to have the will to get rid of these carriers of weapons of mass destruction.

It should be noted that the United States proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of conventional weapons in the first stage, put forward as part of a plan for balanced and uniform reduction, do not provide for the elimination or even the reduction of military bases in foreign territory and of troops stationed at these bases. In this way, the United States, which has installed hundreds of military bases all round the peaceful socialist countries, is trying to secure a considerable and even decisive military advantage at the beginning of disarmament. The military bases in the territories of some of the European allies of the United States represent a considerable danger for the peace and security of the world: their existence during the disarmament process would create a dangerous imbalance in favour of a potential aggressor.

The Soviet Union, which, according to the system of zonal control ingeniously worked out by the United States experts, would have to open up its territory and so reveal its defence system and surrender an important part of its most effective means of defence - global and inter-continental rockets - would be placed in a particularly unfavourable position in comparison with the Western Powers, and especially

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in comparison with the United States. Under such conditions the United States military bases in foreign territory could be used not only for offensive operations, if certain circles, which do not hide their aggressive intentions, were to succeed in imposing their desire to wage war against the Soviet Union. These bases would be used in particular to destroy the Soviet Union's means of defence in the event of the preventive nuclear attack which is mentioned in the statements of certain military leaders and even of some of the statesmen of the United States.

By concentrating their military effort on bases in foreign territory, and especially in the territory of countries surrounding the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the United States would certainly seek to obtain a considerable military advantage. At the same time they would be able to divert the inevitable counter-thrust from the national territory of the United States. It follows that the countries in whose territory these American bases are situated would then become the target of this counter-blow at the outset, since we know that the nuclear weapon carriers of different types and sizes which might be used against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would still be concentrated in these bases.

That being so, it is truly strange and incomprehensible to see the representatives of certain European countries in whose territory United States military bases with rockets and nuclear weapons are situated attempting to justify the absence in the United States draft of any measure for the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory. We were really amazed, in this connexion, that the Italian representative in his speech of 27 August (ENDC/PV.75, p.31) defended these United States bases in foreign territory. He declared indeed that he could not part from his American friends. But the refusal to part from his American friends necessarily implies that the nuclear threat continues to haunt the whole world and especially those countries where the bases are installed.

We are persuaded that the people of the world, and in particular the people of the countries where these bases are installed, do not share this point of view.

It is, admittedly, important to reach agreement on disarmament measures concerning conventional weapons in the first stage, a question on which Soviet concessions and modifications have made a rapprochement possible. It would, however, be an illusion to think that this rapprochement enables us to make serious progress on the road to disarmament if no measures for the removal of the threat of nuclear war are contemplated for the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

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For, as we have stressed, since conventional weapons constitute at present only an infinitesimal part of the destructive power at the disposal of Powers, and in particular of the nuclear Powers, the danger will persist if nuclear weapons are not at least neutralized, if not actually destroyed, as is proposed in the Soviet draft.

In order that disarmament measures in the field of conventional weapons should have any significance, it is necessary to take steps to liquidate and render innocuous nuclear weapons themselves. We must remove the threat of a nuclear war. It is only then that practical measures of disarmament for conventional weapons will have any significance or impact within the general framework of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): It is my intention today to talk about point 5(c) of document ENDC/52, but before doing so I should like to say a few more words on the subject of nuclear testing about which we heard certain comments at our last meeting. Unless anyone should think that the West has not adopted a new position but, as Mr. Kuznetsov told us then, is putting forward the same old girl in a new dress, I would ask my colleagues round this table to consider one simple fact. The Soviet proposals of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) are, and have been acknowledged to be in this Conference, an extreme position. I myself have pointed out how, in putting forward those proposals and abandoning its agreement to on-site inspection and to internationally-manned detection posts on Soviet territory, the Soviet Union had in fact moved backward a long way. And here perhaps I ought to pick up a point made by Mr. Kuznetsov at our last meeting. He said that a question I kept asking was:

"Why has the Soviet delegation not kept to the position it occupied three years ago?",

and he went on:

"Why should it not take into account those changes and advances which are taking place in the world, and why should it continue to adhere to the positions which it occupied three years ago?" (ENDC/PV.76, p. 53)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Those were Mr. Kuznetsov's words, and the question which he said I asked was: "Why has the Soviet delegation not kept to the position it occupied three years ago?" But, of course, it is not my question at all. Indeed, it has not been. The question I am concerned with is: if the Soviet Union is desirous of obtaining agreement, as it claims, why did it take up a much more extreme position last November than it had done formerly? Why does the Soviet Union always move away from and not toward the Western position? I repeat, therefore, that this is, in fact the furthest position from the Western position -- and in addition, of course, the furthest position from the agreed experts' report (EXP/NUC/28) -- that the Soviet Union has at any time taken up. It is, in fact, an extreme position and, as I say, it has been acknowledged to be so in this Committee.

At our twenty-fifth meeting the representative of India talked of the two extreme positions. He referred to something I had said and then went on:

"Please do not go into these negotiations on the basis of those two extreme positions." (ENDC/PV.25, p.48)

Having that in mind, I ask my colleagues to realize that under the new treaty text for a ban on nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water (ENDC/59) which the West has put forward, we are accepting every provision in those Soviet proposals of 28 November except one, and that one is the provision for a moratorium on underground tests. I have the Soviet text here and that is the position. In fact, it can be clearly seen that the West has come a long way to meet the Soviet Union, and we are entitled to expect some response.

I must say that, to me, negotiation -- except where a defected enemy is concerned -- does not mean that one side should concede every demand put forward by the other, particularly when the other side has made its demands more exacting as time goes on. Real negotiation means concessions on both sides. And if the Soviet Union really wants a solution we are entitled to look to it now to make the small concession from its extreme position that is needed for agreement.

I too know the great anxiety and the concern among our non-aligned colleagues here. I believe the anxiety to see agreement on this vital matter is in all our minds, and I share that concern. I hope it can be accepted, however, that if agreement is to be reached it is for the Soviet Union now to make some move.

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Particularly I hope it is clear that any suggestion that the West should now accept a moratorium in addition to the offers we have already made is tantamount to accepting completely the extreme Soviet position of 28 November 1961. For, as I have shown, the new Western proposals for a partial treaty accept every condition of those proposals of 28 November 1961 with this one exception. To ask the West to go further and to accept a moratorium is, in fact, to accept and to endorse the extreme Soviet position. I referred earlier to a comment by our colleague from India. He said also at that same meeting:

"...please remember that there is 'no go' on the basis of the two extreme positions." (ibid)

The phrase "no go" is expressive, and I think that is truly a fact.

And why cannot the West accept a moratorium on underground tests? It is not sufficient for me just to say that because this is a Soviet condition, and because I think the Soviet Union should move in some respect towards the West, therefore it must abandon its call for a moratorium in these circumstances. I would not for one moment seek, for reasons either of equity or of national prestige, to draw some concession from the Soviet Union merely to balance some concession from the West. The issues here are far too serious to permit of such a narrow attitude. No, the reasons which impel the West to resist any form of uncontrolled or unpoliced moratorium are too serious and too recently embedded in history to warrant our ignoring them. During the long and protracted discussions that went on in the three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests between 1958 and the summer of 1961 the one thing that gave hope to the world was the self-imposed restriction on the part of all parties against testing while those talks proceeded. It is true that the Soviet Union, which was the last to test before this self-imposed restraint became fully effective, did carry out some tests shortly after the talks had started. But as far as the United Kingdom and the United States were concerned, and whatever may have been said in either of our countries, neither of us carried out any tests during the whole of the period up until September of last year when the Soviet Union so flagrantly violated its own undertaking.

In view of comments that have been made recently I must remind my colleagues of these facts, and I must remind them that undoubtedly one of the factors which very much influenced the West in accepting what was a self-imposed moratorium was the categoric and explicit statement, made by no less a person than Mr. Khrushchev

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himself, that the Soviet Union would not be the first to start testing again. No head of State could have pledged himself more clearly. And yet, in the event, of what value was that assurance? Further than that, during the first eight months of 1961 the United States and the United Kingdom were continuously in negotiation with the Soviet Union, negotiating on our side in complete good faith, relying on the undertaking that I have just referred to, and during the whole of that time being repeatedly assured by the Soviet negotiator in Geneva that the Soviet Union was still anxious to secure a treaty when we now know that, under cover of those negotiations, it must have been preparing for that enormous volume of testing that was carried out last autumn.

Such a series of tests required vast preparation over many months. It must follow, therefore, that negotiations being carried on in the summer of 1961 were being used on the Soviet Union side as a cover for preparations which it was then making to test. I take no pleasure in reminding representatives of these facts, but it is my duty to explain why the West cannot accept once again any undertaking, however specifically given, in this field unless it is part of a treaty which is, on the one hand, fully comprehensive and carries with it the ability to check whether, in fact, violations of that treaty have taken place, or, on the other hand, a ban in those environments in which there can be no question whether obligations undertaken have been carried out while, at the same time, work goes forward to improve identification techniques in the remaining environment to which a partial ban would not apply.

I have not recorded the facts of the recent past in order to embarrass the representative of the Soviet Union. I do it only to remind all delegations at this Conference why it is that the United States and the United Kingdom feel bound to decline any invitation to accept a moratorium on underground tests. I hope that every delegation will now see that, while we have moved forward a considerable way, there is a limit to concessions that can or should be demanded of the West; and I hope that I am not unreasonable in saying that, for once, we are entitled to look to the Soviet Union to make some move forward in order to reach agreement.

Before leaving the subject of nuclear tests I would just say that I welcome and support the statement of President Kennedy confirming 1 January next as a target date for a treaty to come into effect. As both sides have now said that they

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are willing to use that date as a target, that ought to lead us all to increase our efforts to achieve a treaty. I therefore redouble my plea -- and it is a very genuine plea -- to the Soviet Union to show some forward move.

Now perhaps I could turn to some comments that I wanted to make on item 5(c) of our agenda. As this Committee will be aware, my delegation has, at various times in the course of our discussions, welcomed and supported United States proposals for a 30 per cent reduction across the board of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments in stage I of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by my reiterating this morning the arguments in favour of those proposals; they are well known to the Committee. However, it is clear that, so far as the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I is concerned, the basic provisions of the United States and Soviet plans now show some measure of agreement in principle. That I would take as a hopeful and encouraging sign, and I believe that this Committee is now in a position to make real progress in this particular field. As I said at the time, I found Mr. Zorin's statement on 16 July (ENDC/PV.57) both interesting and important. It has facilitated the Committee's approach to this particular problem.

In this connexion I should like also to welcome the statement made by the representative of the United States on 6 August (ENDC/PV.66) on the question of production allowances in stage I. My delegation supports those changes to the proposals previously put forward by the United States. We consider that the amendments represent a helpful attempt on the part of the United States Government to clarify its position. I was glad that, at our seventy-fifth meeting, Mr. Kuznetsov thought that some common ground existed with regard to production allowances. Such signs of flexibility on both sides give us all cause for qualified hope in this sphere.

I should like to take the opportunity to endorse the remarks which the representative of the United States made on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74) to the effect that our discussions on item 5(b) cannot really be completely divorced from those on item 5(c). I think it must be clear that when we refer to conventional armaments we must at least all know what we are talking about; that is to say, until we know exactly what the Soviet Union representative means by nuclear delivery

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vehicles, then the phrase "conventional armaments" is open to some misunderstanding. I think that Mr. Kuznetsov is clearly aware of this problem. Indeed, it seems to me that he was rather trying to laugh it off by casting aspersions on the military advice which he would like the Committee to believe the West receives. That is to be found on page 39 of document ENDC/PV.75. I would be the last to deny Mr. Kuznetsov any opportunity to enliven our proceedings here, but there really is a difficulty in this case. The Soviet thesis is that by eliminating delivery vehicles the threat of nuclear war is eliminated. The Soviet delegation claims that this measure alone does that; that is to say, that the Soviet proposal is a sufficient measure in itself. But my delegation -- like, I would suspect, many delegations around this table -- is not in the least convinced by that argument. Indeed, to reiterate such an argument uncritically is, I submit, to hold out a cruel hope to an expectant world. What did Mr. Kuznetsov say? Let me analyse one of the detailed statements which he made in his speech on Monday last, 27 August, which I must confess I found somewhat depressing. He said:

"Our military experts consider that there is no difficulty in determining the type of aircraft unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons, such as, for instance, anti-aircraft defence fighter planes, military transport planes, communications aircraft and helicopters and aircraft used for initial training, irrespective of their airborne weight." (ENDC/PV.75, p.40-41)

I want to make it quite clear that I am prepared to agree that some of those aircraft were not designed to deliver nuclear weapons and are not now intended to be used to deliver nuclear weapons. But Mr. Kuznetsov said categorically that they could not be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons. There, I do beg to differ. I submit that such aircraft can be so used and that, as nuclear weapons become less heavy and more compact, more of those aircraft could be so used in the future. I should like to give the Committee one or two simple examples.

I do not know how advanced Russian technology is, but in the West we do have fighter aircraft which can carry missiles with nuclear warheads. Mr. Kuznetsov said that fighter planes could not be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Perhaps there are no Soviet fighters which, at this moment, can carry nuclear weapons -- although I must say that I would be surprised if that were the case. Furthermore, I would say that the bulk of Russian military transport aircraft, as

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well as many of the Soviet Union's civil airliners which are adaptations of their bombers, could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. I have gone into this at some length before, but I am afraid that I have to repeat it in view of what Mr. Kuznetsov said. Indeed, that most improbable of aircraft, the helicopter, could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. After all, we all know that the Russians have a helicopter in the Mil Mi-6 which can lift up to twenty passengers and which has wide opening doors at the rear for loading vehicles -- not perhaps an ideal military vehicle, but, if the conventional types had been removed, it could indeed be used as such.

Turning now to land weapons, Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"In their opinion there is no difficulty in determining conventional weapons for land forces. After all, everybody, even non-military people, know quite well that it is necessary to include among these weapons, for instance, such types of armaments as tanks and self-propelled guns, armoured carriers and armoured cars of all types, artillery unsuitable for firing nuclear shells, such as field guns, anti-aircraft guns, coastal defence artillery and anti-tank guns, mortars and rocket-firing guns of every calibre unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons."

(Ibid, p. 41)

At first sight, of course, this is an impressive list, but I would suggest that Mr. Kuznetsov should have a quiet word with his military advisers. Perhaps they could tell him, and indeed tell us, how it is that the mere fact that a piece of artillery is self-propelled makes it ipso facto incapable of delivering a nuclear shell. Perhaps they would tell us how they would define a piece of artillery which cannot in any circumstances fire a nuclear shell either now or in the indefinite future. You see, we really are in difficulties here because scientific development does not stand still and, although it is broadly true that only large pieces of artillery can now fire nuclear shells, research and development provide each year smaller and smaller nuclear shells which can be fitted to smaller and yet smaller weapons.

Let me quote also another extract from Mr. Kuznetsov's speech, this time dealing with naval matters. In listing weapons which could be classified as conventional armaments, Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"Surface warships and ships that cannot be adapted for the combat use of nuclear weapons should be regarded as conventional weapons, whereas all submarines without exception can be used for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and therefore should all be subject to destruction in the first stage." (ibid.)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The question that I would like to ask Mr. Kuznetsov is: Why does the mere fact that a vessel can submerge make it automatically a nuclear delivery vehicle? Is Mr. Kuznetsov saying here that no surface vessels can in any circumstances deliver nuclear weapons? I am sure he is not. Or is he saying that some can and some cannot deliver nuclear weapons? Well, now, if that is so -- and I take it to be the case -- I hope he will tell the Committee which surface vessels in his opinion could not in any circumstances be used to deliver such weapons. Again, I do not know how advanced Russian technology is, but in the West we have many nuclear weapon systems which can be mounted on surface ships and which could be mounted on merchant ships.

It is for these reasons that I support our United States colleague's appeal that the Soviet delegation should come forward and should clarify as soon as possible what in its view constitutes nuclear delivery vehicles and what conventional armaments. Until it does so I am sure that everyone here will agree that we are in fact working in a twilight zone here even if we are not quite in the dark.

Having said that, however, I do not propose to dwell further today on that particular difficulty which we see and always have seen in the Soviet draft treaty. I should like instead to draw attention to certain aspects of the proposals for the reduction of conventional armaments which in my view deserve further consideration by the Committee before we are in a position to get down to drafting treaty language.

In our previous discussions we have already touched on one of those aspects. Mr. Dean referred to it at our seventy-fourth meeting and Mr. Kuznetsov referred to it at our seventy-fifth meeting. But this morning I should like to refer in particular to the speeches made by our Canadian colleague Mr. Burns and by our Swedish colleague Mrs. Myrdal who, on 6 June and 13 June respectively, drew our attention to the special problems facing the smaller Powers during the later stages of the disarmament process.

As Mrs. Myrdal pointed out, their interest in disarmament is particularly related to the question of the reduction of conventional armaments; they do not have responsibility for limiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, and, to quote Mrs. Myrdal's actual words:

"The fact that we are passively concerned as potential victims of nuclear war, as well as nuclear tests, needs no re-emphasis. However, conventional war remains a threatening reality from the point of view of the smaller Powers."

(ENDC/PV.55, p.64)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Mr. Burns raised the same problem in some detail and, taking the example of a hypothetical country, suggested:

"... that the correct approach to determining the cuts in its armed forces in the second stage, or even in the first, is to know with some precision what forces or police this country would require to fulfil its obligations as a sovereign State under conditions of general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.50, p.45)

When we reach item 5(f) of our agreed procedure we shall be discussing disarmament measures with regard to armed forces together with appropriate control measures and I do not therefore wish to anticipate our discussions on that point, but, in spite of what our Soviet colleague told us at our seventy-fifth meeting, I think there is a real problem here for very many countries of the world in connexion with this question of conventional armaments. Indeed this problem is clearly of direct and immediate concern to all such Powers whether they are represented at this table or not since they will have to consider when to adhere to a world-wide treaty on general and complete disarmament. But if, for example, we try to apply a 30 per cent cut of conventional armaments in stage I on a world-wide scale, some Powers might argue with some degree of justification that they would be faced with serious and difficult problems, the complexity of which would permit of no easy solution. They might be unable in fact to accept such a cut in stage I until they knew what final figures would be allowed for their internal security forces. Some countries whose existing armed forces are already designed only for internal security purposes might not be required to make any cuts in conventional armaments at all. In the case of other countries the reduction in such armaments might not bear any direct proportional relationship to the reduction of conventional armaments by the great Powers. Thus, in assessing the scale on which armaments should be reduced, we may have to take as a basis for our calculations the final figure required for each country's obligations at the end of stage III and thus, as it were, work backwards.

I would not wish to draw any firm conclusions from this brief analysis at this stage. However, I might just say in passing that when the final requirements for internal security purposes -- particularly of the smaller Powers of which I am thinking now -- come to be considered it may well be found unrealistic to apply on a world-wide scale a reduction of 30 per cent on all small conventional armaments in stage I.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Even if this proposal were applied only to the United States and the Soviet Union there is the objection, with which we are all familiar, that the verification process could well be overloaded at the early stage of the disarmament process. Be that as it may, I think it is already clear that in considering other countries' needs -- and my delegation is very conscious of these problems -- we must take into account the complex variety of factors involved; for instance, the size of the country, the terrain, the density of the population, the adequacy of the internal communications and any special internal problems which could exist in any particular country.

All these factors, I submit, will have to be examined -- and examined in great detail -- and so I would like to take this opportunity of endorsing the practical suggestion put forward by Mr. Dean on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74, p.50), that a working sub-committee might be set up to examine the problems involved for smaller Powers in a 30 per cent cut in conventional armaments. I should be interested to hear the views of other delegations on this particular suggestion. I was sorry to hear Mr. Kuznetsov's reaction to it (ENDC/PV.75, p.49) because it seemed to me that he misunderstood the proposal that had been made. Mr. Dean did not propose that a sub-committee should be set up in order to decide whether 100 per cent or 30 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles should be eliminated in stage I; that is a problem which those countries possessing nuclear delivery vehicles will clearly have to resolve. But the purpose of the proposed sub-committee, as I understood it, will be to examine the problems involved for the smaller Powers in a 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments in stage I. Such a cut in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union is something on which, as Mr. Kuznetsov himself has said, we have already reached a broad measure of agreement. But it is the question of the effect on the smaller countries with which the sub-committee would be concerned.

Mr. Kuznetsov asked why the West should be so concerned about the position of the smaller countries. He asked how we knew that those countries would not wish to reduce their conventional armaments in the first stage. He went on to suggest that it would be better to leave it to the smaller countries to state what they require in order to defend their security and independence. Those are precisely the questions which in my view a sub-committee could and should consider.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I was of course glad to hear Mr. Kuznetsov say that as regards the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I some exceptions would have to be made for some of the smaller Powers. Surely this is another aspect of the question which the sub-committee could usefully consider. I do hope -- and this is a practical suggestion, it seems to me -- that our Committee could agree on this. I frankly do not understand opposition to such an obviously sensible measure as this one, and I hope the Committee will agree to set up a sub-committee. If so, I would suggest that it ought to include some, or possibly all, of the non-aligned delegations represented at this Conference.

As I said at the beginning, it is encouraging that, unlike our discussions on certain other issues before this Conference, we seem on this question of conventional weapons to have some measure of agreement in principle on the reduction of these particular weapons. Although there are many problems still to be tackled this should give us some start in the finding of detailed solutions which have to take into account the interests of all countries, as I have just been saying; and I believe we ought to be able to make real progress on this particular item.

Before I finish I do want to say one word to inform my colleagues that I should like to circulate to the Conference this morning a paper prepared by the United Kingdom.^{2/} This paper is not related to the item I have just been talking about but is, in fact, related to item 5(d) and is entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production". I want to say at once that I am not proposing that the Committee should consider this paper at this stage or, indeed, before we proceed to item 5(d). I do not wish in any way to anticipate our discussion on that item; nor am I suggesting that we are now concluding our discussion on item 5(c): certainly not. My delegation is circulating this paper purely for the convenience of the Committee because many of my colleagues from other delegations were kind enough to express interest in the two papers (ENDC/53 and ENDC/54) tabled by my delegation when we were discussing item 5(b); but some of them did say that if the papers had been circulated in advance of discussion

^{2/} ENDC/60

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

of that item, it would have been more help. Incidentally, recalling our Soviet colleague's reaction to them I think if he had had further time to consider them it might have helped him too.

In view of this I thought that the members of the Committee would on this occasion care to study this document in advance of reaching this item on the agenda, in order to be aware of the points in it when the time comes to make their comments on item 5(d). I hope that in that way the work of the Committee will be facilitated, and I shall be ready when the time comes, under item 5(d), to comment on the points in the paper. I therefore ask that it should be circulated as a Conference document.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): My delegation is fully appreciative of the constructive efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in submitting two new draft treaties on the cessation of nuclear tests for our consideration and discussion. While we have carefully examined and considered both documents, I shall confine my remarks today to the alternative partial draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/59).

In this connexion I wish to state the position of my delegation. With special emphasis my delegation has repeatedly demanded from the nuclear Powers the cessation of all nuclear tests. We have stated, and we repeat today, that all testing is bad, whether it is undertaken by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States or France; and that would be our position tomorrow if it were undertaken by China or any other country. We do not recognize the right of any country to test, be it in first, second, or last place.

We have claimed an absolute priority for consideration of the nuclear tests issue and we have not concealed our feeling that any discussion on the wording of articles of an eventual treaty on general and complete disarmament appears to us rather pointless and sterile when we cannot agree on the more direct and more clear-cut issue of a nuclear cease-fire. Particular and constant emphasis on the question of atmospheric tests has been made by Brazil since 16 March, at the very start of this Conference, when Professor San Thiago Dantas first addressed the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. These were his words at the third plenary meeting:

"Another matter on which I wish to inform the Committee of Brazil's point of view is the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, particularly tests in the atmosphere." (ENDC/PV.3, p.8)

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

Later Professor San Thiago Dantas said:

"The technicians of the nations most advanced in nuclear science are, I believe, agreed on the possibility of effective control of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere, without more thorough on-site inspections and checks being necessary. We therefore consider that these tests should be suspended immediately. As regards underground tests, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled." (ibid., p.9)

We do not think that any kind of testing should be permitted or condoned; we are for the immediate cessation of all tests. We do not believe in the existence of a "clean" bomb; no bomb can be clean, when the so-called "clean bomb" brings with it, or has the concentrated power to bring with it, the destruction of hundreds of thousands, and maybe millions, of human beings.

In an official note (ENDC/56), my Government has addressed an earnest appeal to the nuclear Powers to come, through mutual concessions and a spirit of compromise, to an agreement on the modality of control envisaged in the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28). My delegation firmly believes that the eight-nation joint memorandum is still the best available document to help negotiations on a comprehensive test ban; we feel that somehow or other negotiations on the document have not materialized. My delegation does not, however, consider the eight-nation memorandum as an untouchable document, and we have urged the great Powers not to take such painstaking efforts to ascertain the real intentions of the eight nations, as the real intentions of the eight nations were, in our opinion, to press for negotiations likely to bring about the cessation of all nuclear tests. As a matter of fact I have committed my delegation to defend any mutually agreed interpretation of the terms of our joint memorandum on one sole condition -- that such an interpretation would not allow for the unchecked continuation of nuclear tests.

Because of the stalemate that prevailed on the over-all question, in the light of disagreement on the problems of control, my delegation at the plenary meeting of 25 July addressed a question to the nuclear Powers (ENDC/PV.61, p.36): if the main divergencies did refer to the problem of detection and verification of underground tests, why should not the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests concentrate its

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

efforts, as a first step, on those tests which did not present problems of control? At that time no answer was forthcoming from the nuclear Powers. Three weeks later, at the plenary meeting of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71/p.16), we reiterated our question, and again no answer, whether public or private, was forthcoming from the nuclear Powers.

Although we keep pressing for the simultaneous cessation of all nuclear tests, on a mutually acceptable basis, my delegation was gratified to see that the new proposals submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom in the alternative draft treaty on a partial ban do represent an important step forward and a genuine effort towards the reconciliation of opposite views on the cessation of nuclear tests. It should not pass unnoticed that the dispute has disappeared as regards the necessity or the lack of necessity for control of atmospheric, outer space and under water tests. This fact should be stressed. We have covered a lot of ground since 27 August; it would be less than fair not to acknowledge that. The divergencies are now confined to the question of detection and identification of underground tests, the importance of which we do not underestimate.

From the verbatim record (ENDC/SC.1/PV.24) of the last meeting of the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests, as well as from what we heard at our last plenary meeting (ENDC/PV.76), it is obvious that a new stalemate has developed, but it is important to make this clear: this stalemate -- for there is one -- is situated some steps ahead, at a more advanced stage of our progress towards the cessation of all nuclear tests. We may indeed be facing a rather strange situation in which the nuclear Powers have come closer to an agreement than they would dare or care to admit and acknowledge.

From the arguments set forth by the nuclear Powers, in the Sub-Committee on nuclear tests and at our last plenary meeting, we have the impression that the possibility of a partial ban was not altogether discarded by any delegation and it is our considered opinion that negotiations should proceed on what appears to present better chances of immediate agreement.

Regardless of the discouraging conclusion of last Tuesday's meeting of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee we see some hope in the fact that the nuclear Powers are willing to call another meeting of that Sub-Committee. A partial agreement

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil).

on the question of nuclear tests may not be the best solution to this problem, but I dare say such a possibility is a step worth considering by the nuclear Powers in the framework of the over-all settlement which we are all bound to seek.

As both sides have stated here, underground tests play a part in the development of nuclear weapons, and this cannot be neglected if we are to put a stop to the arms race. But, besides being the most dangerous for mankind, both actually and potentially, tests in the atmosphere and in outer space play still a more ominous and disquieting role in the development of high-yield weapons, which hang over the heads of humanity. Let us reflect for one moment on what would be the effects on the alarming arsenal already held by nuclear Powers of an unchecked anti-missile missile race. Such a race is already taking shape.

It is our understanding that at its next meeting the Sub-Committee will consider all proposals, ideas and suggestions that have been submitted by several delegations to this plenary Committee, with special emphasis on Dr. Padilla Nervo's suggestion (ENDC/PV.34, p.16) regarding a deadline for the cessation of all nuclear tests. On this question of a nuclear test ban, no position can be recognized as final and immovable. The only final and immovable position which we would recognize as a valid one would be a joint position, arrived at through negotiations, carrying with it the cessation of all nuclear tests. While negotiations proceed no position is final, and of course we are still pressing for further negotiation. We are prepared to accept and welcome any solution, with any amount of control, on which the great Powers might agree in order to bring about a simultaneous cessation of all nuclear tests. At this stage we shall, therefore, refrain from advancing new suggestions until we feel they are likely to facilitate a mutual agreement. On a matter like this, which cannot be settled by vote or by the sum of opinions and positions, agreement, not polemics, between the two sides is of the essence. We shall be pressing for negotiations in New York within the General Assembly if, contrary to all hopes, no positive results are achieved in Geneva. But we still hope for such results.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): Like the representative of Brazil -- to whom my delegation listened with great care and attention, as we always do -- I will limit my intervention this morning to some comments on the question of a test ban.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

After several months of an often polemic exchange of views on a test ban treaty, sometimes giving us a disconsolate feeling that both sides were rigidly bound in their positions, there have been taken during the past few weeks several significant initiatives which have made things move. In the first place I am of course thinking of the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom on a first-step treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, presented on 27 August (ENDC/59); Mr. Kuznetsov's speech of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71), with its extensive account of the Soviet position with regard to an international commission and to the question of on-site inspection; and the acceptance by the Western Powers of a detection system based upon nationally-manned observation posts.

All this represents important steps from both sides which we in the Swedish delegation welcome. In several important areas they have brought the parties closer together and should, therefore, facilitate a final agreement. To state this does not mean that one underestimates the remaining differences and difficulties. That they exist we all know. It was plainly emphasized at our last plenary meeting. But it is hard to imagine that those who lead the most powerful countries in the world should not have the power to master the remaining difficulties against the background of the alternative to an agreement banning nuclear tests. We all know that alternative: a continued upward turn of the nuclear armament spiral, continued testing, continued poisoning of the air we breathe and the food we eat, new and ever more destructive weapons and, as a consequence of all this, increased dangers even in peace-time for the well-being of millions of people, for living and unborn generations.

I have many times asked myself how any country can allow itself to gamble with the surroundings of the globe as if those surroundings were its own exclusive property. But that is exactly what is happening and what will continue to happen, with steadily increasing risks for mankind, if we do not manage to master the paradox of our time: the fact that the law of the jungle is allowed to rule us in the atomic age. It is this state of affairs which has resulted in what Mr. Fattah Hassan in his excellent speech on 15 August described as: "nothing short of actual aggression against humanity" (ENDC/PV.70, p.27)

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Where would a continued nuclear arms race lead us in the long run? Sometimes we are told that it is unrealistic to try to achieve disarmament, since it would mean reversing man's pattern of behaviour as it has developed from a foggy past. But it would seem even more unrealistic to imagine that the nuclear arms race could continue with mutual threats and increasing fear year after year, decade after decade, without this leading one day to a cataclysm.

Since 1945, when the shock of the first atomic bombs was spread all over the world, we have witnessed explosions of bombs three thousand times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb -- super bombs with explosive energy fifteen to twenty times as big as that of all the bombs used during the Second World War, which, to use another comparison, means that one single such super bomb possesses more than five times the explosive power of all conventional projectiles used in all wars since the discovery of gunpowder.

Each year that passes with continued perfection of destructive weapons must obviously and with mathematical certainty increase the risk of catastrophe. I suppose this is what Mr. Godber had in mind when he stated: "the fate of mankind may be involved in this issue." (ENDC/PV.75, p.20); what Mr. Dean had in mind when he said: "If we do not stop testing altogether, we may stop human progress altogether" (*ibid.*, p.5); and what Mr. Kuznetsov had in mind when he stressed:

"... the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests will certainly not stop the nuclear arms race and, consequently, the threat of a thermonuclear war will only be increased." (ENDC/PV.76, p. 19)

I am referring to statements made at our last two plenary meetings by representatives who should know better than any of us what is involved. This is a prospect which we must see before us as a pillar of dust in the day and a pillar of fire in the night.

A test ban is obviously the gate through which we have to pass if we are at all to travel further. Without a test ban the prospects for achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament seem small, whereas a cessation of nuclear tests would ease the tension, bring about a better atmosphere and serve as a starting point for continued efforts to reduce the burdens of armament. Without a test ban it is doubtful whether we shall achieve an agreement preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, while, on the other hand, a test ban treaty would in itself

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

have the moral and practical effect of a bar on other countries that are about to enter the nuclear arms race. Without a test ban there is this desperate and frightening prospect for the future which we all know only too well.

In that perspective the remaining differences and difficulties must seem small, indeed very small. I think this would have been still more obvious today if all the time, effort and intelligence that during recent months have been used for finding points of disagreement had instead been devoted to the more constructive task of trying to find points of agreement.

Today we can distinguish two main lines in our work. One is to arrive at an agreement which would for all time ban all kinds of nuclear weapon tests. The other has a more limited goal: an agreement to put an end to all tests that do not require any international verification machinery. My delegation does not consider those objectives to be alternatives. The more limited one should, in our opinion, be regarded as complementary and preliminary to the more comprehensive objective. The final aim of our efforts must be to achieve a treaty banning for ever all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. That is the kind of treaty we have been discussing here for almost half a year, and it is in such a treaty that a permanent solution of the problem will be found.

At our plenary meeting on Monday, 27 August, the United States and United Kingdom delegations presented a draft of such a comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58). My delegation regards that document as a sincere effort to bring us down to detailed and concrete negotiations concerning a treaty. We take it that the United States and United Kingdom draft is intended as a bid for consideration in such concrete negotiations. Both Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber were anxious to indicate that the offer was negotiable. In that case, it would seem that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union are on the whole in agreement as to future procedure. I would draw attention to Mr. Kuznetsov's declaration that the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the three-Power Sub-Committee should proceed forthwith to the drafting of a test ban treaty. (ENDC/PV.69, p.29)

It is such a procedure of concrete and detailed negotiation that the non-aligned countries have repeatedly asked the nuclear Sub-Committee to embark upon.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

But the presentation of negotiating bids also means that the eight-Power joint memorandum of 16 April remains in the middle of the road. The memorandum does not contain the text of a treaty. It has been emphasized repeatedly that the memorandum does not free the nuclear Powers from the painstaking work of hammering out the details of a treaty, but it does contain certain basic principles and offer some guiding lines for a compromise. We still feel that it provides not only a realistic but probably the only possible bridge for a compromise. When Mr. Kuznetsov recommended the immediate drafting of a test ban treaty, he added on the basis of the eight-Power joint memorandum of 16 April (ibid). Sir Michael Wright expressed a similar view in his statement on 20 August, when he declared:

"We believe that the bridge should be provided by the eight-Power memorandum." (ENDC/PV.72, pp. 5-6)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall now make a modest effort to indicate a few points on which the two sides seem after all to have drawn closer together. It is therefore natural that I should use the eight-Power memorandum as a signpost -- without, of course, making any textual interpretation of a document which rests on its own merits.

As has often been pointed out, the memorandum aimed at finding a solution to the problem of observation and control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. The first basic principle was that continuous control should be based and built upon the already existing networks of observation posts and institutions. That approach differed essentially from the 1961 proposal of the Western Powers, which provided for internationally manned detection posts. What was therefore demanded on that point was a concession by the Western Powers. Today we have such a concession. After his return from Washington Mr. Dean made it known that the Western Powers, basing themselves upon their own new scientific results, accepted the principle of nationally manned and nationally operated observation posts. My delegation attaches great importance to that; it means a new position on the Western side which should certainly facilitate the endeavours to reach agreement on a test ban treaty.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

We all know the differences between the parties with regard to the concept of "international supervision", which has been further elaborated in the draft treaty submitted by the Western Powers. Obviously, I do not intend to go into any details here. I imagine that even if the approach of the two parties is different a certain flexibility would prove to exist once real and concrete negotiations were entered upon.

Perhaps we should not forget another concept in this connexion -- that of co-ordination. In the scientific fields which are most relevant to us the trend is towards an increased degree of co-ordination. During the Geophysical Year, when observations from local stations were transmitted to world data centres within various scientific disciplines, a certain degree of co-ordination was called for. My delegation has tried earlier to show how a number of stations in different parts of the world are now co-operating in a plan to get more rapid and more homogeneous records of seismic data, and also how plans have been advanced to establish within this field a central world institute for the processing of data with the aid of electronic computers. Furthermore, the Economic and Social Council, at its 1116th plenary meeting, adopted resolution 767(XXX) calling for further co-ordination of seismological observation and research. The purpose of this is to reduce, by adequate use of national and international services, the great loss of human life and extensive material damage caused by earthquakes and seismic sea waves. But what is called for is also of interest to our Committee, because the development towards increased co-ordination which takes place, particularly in seismology, is of importance for our purposes too and should be further encouraged. We take it that in a system for the supervision of a test ban treaty regular scientific work would, as hitherto, be the main function of the different stations, which would mean that their special task in connexion with a test ban agreement would be an integral part of their regular scientific endeavours. Whether to choose a limited number of posts for that special task or a more flexible system with more posts and institutions involved would seem to be a matter to be decided on purely practical considerations.

What I have just said only goes to emphasize the fact that once the Western Powers have accepted the principle of national observation posts there should not be too serious difficulty in reaching agreement on the practical shaping of the detection system.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

The second basic principle in the memorandum is that of an international commission entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event. As all will remember, when we met in the spring the Soviet delegation was opposed to every kind of international element. What was asked for in this context, therefore, was a concession by the Soviet side. On 19 April that concession was announced in a statement by the Soviet Government (ENDC/32). That meant that the Soviet Union was taking a position which was new and different from the one held at the beginning of the Conference. My delegation considered that an important step towards the achievement of an effective agreement banning nuclear tests.

As far as I can remember, the idea of an international commission consisting of highly qualified scientists has not met with any difficulties at all during our negotiations since the principle was accepted by the Soviet Union. It would not be unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the final shaping of the commission and its duties could be carried out in an atmosphere of understanding. It is true that no detailed discussions have yet taken place as to the composition of the commission, the size of its staff, its location, its equipment with modern and efficient instrumentation, and so on, but they are all practical questions which should involve no controversial principles.

In regard to both the detection system and the purely practical functions of the commission there are certain questions of an organizational and technical nature which should preferably be treated on the expert level. Would it not be worth while to consider now the establishment, at least on an interim basis, of the commission proposed in the eight-Power memorandum, about which the parties are in agreement, with, as a first task, the scientific examination of the question of how a control system should be organized? We believe that that would extend the area of agreement and thereby also facilitate our endeavours to arrive at a permanent test ban treaty. My delegation would have welcomed the forthcoming recess being used for such preparatory work.

Let us now look for a moment at the third element -- the relationship between the commission and the contracting parties. If we still follow the lines of direction in the eight-Power memorandum we find that East and West are in agreement to a large extent on this point too. Both sides accept an obligation for the parties to furnish

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

the commission with facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Both sides agree that the commission, if it is unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a suspicious event, should inform the party concerned of the points on which urgent clarification seems necessary. Both sides are prepared to take part in a procedure of consultations as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment. Both have declared that they are prepared to give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment. "The Soviet Union subscribes to this without any reservation", declared Mr. Kuznetsov in his important speech on 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, p.42).

If I have understood Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber correctly they have followed their Soviet colleague up to this cross-road. It is when we reach the procedure of on-site inspection that the roads separate. The Western Powers keep to a scheme of obligatory on-site inspection. The Soviet Union stated: "We do not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in specific cases." Or to quote again an extract from Mr. Kuznetsov's declaration of 17 August: "In the light of all these considerations", -- Mr. Kuznetsov had inter alia spoken about the reaction of world public opinion if a nuclear Power should refuse to invite the commission to assess the nature of an event -- "is it possible to come to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers will always refuse to invite the commission to visit their territory? Of course, it is impossible to come to such a conclusion: it would be quite unjustified" (ENDC/PV.71, p.43). This is a statement the significance of which is evident to everybody. It means that the Soviet Union in principle has accepted on-site inspections.

It is obvious that there is still an essential difference between the Anglo-American approach and that of the Soviet Union to the problem of the on-site inspection. It is no use trying to shut our eyes to that fact. It is here we have had our real difficulties from the beginning. And that is where they remain. Still I think that if one would sit down and look at the matter from purely practical and pragmatic points of view, the gap would prove to be smaller than it appears when looked upon through the spectacles of principles. "The difference between the two sides is not wide, it is narrow", said Sir Michael Wright in a statement some days ago (ENDC/PV.72, p.5). A careful study of the position of both sides has led my delegation to the same conclusion.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

The area which we have to cover here is also limited. It is only the underground tests which we are concerned about when we talk about on-site inspection. And even here the field has shrunk. Mr. Dean has informed us that on the basis of the experience gained through the so-called Vela Project (ENDC/45) the Western Powers have, to a greater extent than was earlier believed to be possible, been able to exclude certain categories of underground events from obligatory on-site inspection. Basing myself on our own scientists I think the situation can be expressed as follows: almost all events of the size of a nuclear underground explosion can be detected. Explanation is also possible in a great number of cases, but one has still not reached so far that this can be achieved 100 per cent. The conclusion is that the doubtful cases represent a part, and we might be justified in believing a shrinking part, of all underground events. Because while we continue our debates here technical development also continues. We cannot exclude the possibility that with refined instruments and new methods we might in the not-too-distant future be able to eliminate completely the remaining margin of uncertainty. Thereby the whole problem of on-site inspection would disappear. However important the question of inspection may be, it is still only a part of a greater entirety. We refuse to believe that disagreement on this point would be allowed to block the road to a test ban treaty.

Mr. Burns had some wise words to say in this connexion on 15 August. He said:

"Instead of becoming deadlocked on the principle of on-site inspection, members of the Conference, particularly the nuclear Powers, should examine the practical steps required in setting up, as envisaged in the eight-nation memorandum, a worldwide detection system the essential elements of which appear to have been accepted by all the nuclear Powers."

(ENDC/PV.70. p. 36)

My delegation wholeheartedly concurs in this. That is why we hope that the two parties will now start concrete and detailed preparations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, following the guiding lines of the eight-Power memorandum.

I would now like to say a few words about the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for a partial agreement banning all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. As I mentioned at the beginning of

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my statement, we do not regard a treaty of such a more limited nature as an alternative to a test ban treaty embracing all categories of tests. Every partial solution that the nuclear Powers can agree upon pending the elaboration of a comprehensive agreement and its entering into force would however mean an important step towards a definite nuclear cease-fire. Above all, this applies to those tests which represent the greatest dangers for the life and well-being of man.

The position of the Swedish Government in regard to the nuclear armaments race is well known from our work in the United Nations. In particular all the members of this Committee are well familiar with our views. We consider that no effort should be spared until all tests in all environments have been outlawed for all the future. In the same spirit we are anxious to contribute to preventing further spread of nuclear weapons; this was the underlying motive of the Swedish initiative at last year's General Assembly on what has popularly been called a non-atomic club. But where it has not been possible to reach immediately the ultimate goal we have welcomed every provisional measure, every partial solution that has seemed to be within reach and which has been aimed at bringing us some steps closer to the goal. It was this position of principle which was reflected in Mrs. Myrdal's speech on 1 August, when she appealed to the Sub-Committee "to take up as a primary item on its agenda [for decision] this matter of a preliminary test ban treaty, restricted if necessary to tests in certain environments" (ENDC/PV.64, p.8). Mrs. Myrdal stated in this connexion:

"for the sake of demonstrating good will the nuclear Powers would now at least have to assure us that an agreement on those categories of tests for which no inspection is needed and no 'espionage' is to be feared would be within our immediate reach". (Ibid., p. 7)

And she added:

"If such an undertaking were restricted, as an initial measure, to atmospheric and outer space tests -- plus, I hope, underwater tests -- a treaty would be easy to draft and the hopes of the tormented world would mount and confidence would begin to be felt." (Ibid.)

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On this basis my delegation welcomes the proposal of a partial treaty as a constructive contribution to the solution of a problem that more than any other engages our thoughts and presses on our nerves.

The Soviet reply to the Western proposals can be divided in two parts. In the first the Soviet delegation declares its readiness to arrive at an agreement of a final nature banning from a date in the near future nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In the second part of its answer the Soviet delegation puts as a condition for its participation that an understanding be reached simultaneously to refrain from underground tests. That understanding would remain in force until such time as it could be replaced by a permanent solution. To that the Western Powers answer that they cannot accept an uncontrolled moratorium in any guise on underground tests.

Does that mean that there is no possibility to build a bridge between the apparently incompatible positions? We refuse to accept such a conclusion until all possibilities of bridging the gap have been explored. We believe that this has not been the case so far. It would, of course, be presumptuous of my delegation to try at this juncture to bring forward any ideas for solving the dilemma, but we feel that there are still certain lines and combinations which the nuclear Powers could and should carefully consider in a serious effort to find a common platform. We can, therefore, only appeal to the nuclear Powers to renew their efforts to find ways both to a partial agreement and to an all-categories embracing test ban treaty, which still remains the ultimate goal.

Compromises can never be reached without concessions and sacrifices on both sides. As I have tried to point out, in the course of our negotiations important concessions have been made by both parties. In spite of all signs to the contrary, the sides have, in reality, come closer to each other. Seen against the frightening alternative of no agreement at all the remaining differences must seem so small that it will be difficult for the nuclear Powers to explain to world opinion why they cannot agree, and difficult to defend the fact that month after month is passing by without substantial results while monitory signals from ever new explosions are ringing in our ears.

We have the assurances of both sides that they sincerely wish to end all nuclear weapons tests. We certainly want to believe their words. But then we also have the right to expect them to do their utmost to realize their own wishes.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): My delegation has listened with the greatest interest this morning to the statements made by the representatives of Brazil and Sweden, and they will of course be studied carefully by us.

On Wednesday, at his news conference, President Kennedy made an important announcement regarding the effort of the United States to achieve an effective treaty on nuclear weapons tests as soon as possible. I wish to quote his announcement. The President said:

"In Geneva this morning the Soviet representative proposed that an agreement should be reached on a cut-off time for all nuclear weapons tests and that this date should be set as of January 1, 1963. I am happy to say that the United States Government regards this as a reasonable target date and would like to join with all interested parties in a maximum effort to conclude effective agreements which can enter into force on next New Year's Day. To accomplish this purpose, the Governments involved must accelerate their negotiations looking towards an agreed treaty. For our part, in the United States, such an agreed treaty must be presented to the Senate for consent to ratification. We therefore have no time to lose. The world will welcome an agreement that a way should be found to stop all nuclear testing at the end of this year. But I must point out again that in order to end testing we must have workable international agreements. Gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide the types of guarantees that are necessary. They do not give assurance against an abrupt renewal of testing by unilateral action."

I have been informed that the United Kingdom concurs with the United States that 1 January 1963 is indeed a possible cut-off date.

We now have agreement between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States that tests should stop on 1 January 1963, provided of course, as the Western delegations understand, that an effective international treaty has been concluded by that time. This is, indeed, a noteworthy advance in our negotiations. I firmly believe that on the basis of the two treaty drafts (documents ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) which the United States and the United Kingdom have already submitted to this Conference we should earnestly attempt to reach an agreement which would become effective on 1 January 1963.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

That means that we have only a very short time in which to complete our task in order to reach agreement by 1 January 1963, as we sincerely hope, either on a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time under appropriate international supervision or, if need be, then at least on a limited treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Therefore, the nuclear Powers at this Conference must work even harder than they have worked up to now in order to meet this cut-off date. We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will give us an indication that it is prepared to negotiate on the basis of our two treaty proposals and to reach agreement as soon as possible.

In order to meet the cut-off date my Government, after consultation with the United Kingdom, formally proposes to the Conference that our Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should continue to meet during the recess period. My Government believes that, by keeping the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban in session, and with maximum pressure on the Sub-Committee to reach agreement, it should be possible to complete our task of reaching agreement on the text of a treaty by 1 November of this year so that it could become effective not later than 1 January 1963. We intend to continue the negotiations on the basis of the two draft treaties which were tabled by the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, in his statement on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76), reiterated a number of arguments with regard to why the Soviet Union felt that it could not change any of its positions in spite of the major moves made by the United Kingdom and the United States in introducing two draft treaties in an effort to reach agreement.

Let me review briefly the reasons why the Soviet Union maintains that it must reject out of hand all moves made by the United States and the United Kingdom to reach a satisfactory nuclear test ban agreement.

First, the Soviet representative states that the United States-United Kingdom position on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is really the same old girl dressed up in new finery to catch a suitor and that our treaty has not changed. I regret to say, in view of the great regard which I have for the representative of the Soviet Union, that in this matter he is in factual error. The position has

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indeed changed. The position of the United Kingdom and the United States is really a new baby, and it is a new baby quite unpainted and in diapers and seeking affection from the Soviet Union. For a comprehensive treaty the nature of the operation of the detection stations on each party's territory has changed. The staffing of inspection teams, as the representative of Sweden pointed out this morning, has changed. The number of detection stations will be changed. The number of annual on-site inspections will be changed. The Soviet representative might argue that the United States and the United Kingdom have not changed enough to suit the Soviet Union, and that the United States and the United Kingdom, to reach agreement, must accept all the terms demanded by the Soviet Union. This the Soviet representative can argue because this is apparently what he means; but he cannot convince anyone who is willing to examine the facts that the position of the United Kingdom and the United States has not changed.

Secondly, the Soviet representative argues that the requirement of objective obligatory on-site inspections by an impartial international commission is unjustified. This also is an error of fact. The United States had demonstrated conclusively, by bringing to this Conference experts and data, that on-site inspections will be necessary in some cases to detect, locate and identify the nature of an unidentified seismic event. As I have pointed out previously, it does no good to detect if we cannot identify and if we cannot locate. We all hope that, despite the enormous advantages that we have received through scientific research, this scientific progress will go on. But, as we can hear many more seismic events of rather low yield, the problem only becomes more complicated, while our scientists will undoubtedly continue their research according to the best scientific advice I could get -- and I have done my best to try to determine this on a highly objective basis -- there is no immediate prospect of any further improvement in this field.

The Soviet Union has not adduced here at this Conference a shred of scientific information to show that the data and the evidence presented by the United States and the United Kingdom are incorrect. We have invited the Soviet delegation to bring its scientists here, and it has declined. We can, however, carry the argument one step further. If, by some technique that the Soviet Union is not now willing to disclose, all seismic events can be detected, located and identified by distant instrumentation, then the treaty proposed by the United States and the

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United Kingdom provides a proper procedure. In such a case the highly competent international staff, including the executive officer of the international scientific commission under the treaty would never certify that an event remained unidentified; and if there were no certifications of unidentified events, then there simply could not be any on-site inspections on Soviet territory. If the Soviet Union is positive that an on-site inspection will never be called for, then it should be willing to accept the objective and scientific procedures contained in the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58). And under that treaty on-site inspections can only be certified by the commission using definite and objective scientific criteria, as set forth in the treaty.

Thirdly, the Soviet representative maintains that inspection can only take place by invitation from the party on whose territory an unidentified event has been certified by the commission. But an invitation is something which rests entirely in the hands of the person who is considering issuing it. This position is contrary to the pledge made by the United States and the Soviet Union in the joint statement of agreed principles that disarmament measures

"should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations" (ENDC/5).

Inspection by invitation gives no assurance that the parties are honouring their obligations, because inspection by invitation is really inspection at the will of the possible violator, who may or may not issue the invitation. Inspection by invitation gives no assurance that the obligations are being or will be honoured and, therefore, it cannot be the basis for an effective verification system in a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests on which parties can rely. Inspection by invitation puts a premium on violation. Inspection by invitation penalizes the party living up to its obligation. The non-violator can never be sure what the other person is doing. To say that one accepts inspection by invitation, that one accepts inspection by the commission but will decide oneself whether the inspection will take place, is, I submit, taking away with one hand what has been granted with the other. So there really is no acceptance of the right of inspection by the international commission in the position so far advanced by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union would meet us on that small point, then we would have our comprehensive treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

So long as the Soviet Union persists in its adherence to this untenable position of inspection by invitation, it throws in grave doubt -- very grave doubt -- the Soviet Union's obligation to stop testing. If the Soviet Government really meant it, it would accept effective verification. Its refusal raises grave doubts whether it really intends to stop testing. That, it seems to me, is the plain truth of the matter.

Fourthly, the Soviet representative argues that, as the price for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet Union

"must lay open to the Western Powers and the military NATO bloc its system of national defence in the circumstances where the Western countries do not hide the fact that they are carrying out preparations for a nuclear war against the peace-loving States." (ENDC/PV.76, p. 14.)

That charge is not only false; it is absurd. I have referred to the alleged evidence with respect to it and I have pointed out that it is completely groundless and that there is no such intention and that there are no such preparations. I submit that the Soviet Union only poisons the atmosphere of this Conference when it wrongfully charges that the United States is preparing for an attack against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union evidently believes in the tactic of the big lie, which it repeats again and again and again without the slightest regard for the truth.

Furthermore, the Governments of NATO would have nothing whatsoever to do with inspecting the Soviet Union's territory under the draft comprehensive test ban treaty proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States. To say otherwise, I submit, would be a reflection on the dedication of international civil servants who serve so faithfully and so objectively on many international bodies, and who would serve similarly on the proposed international scientific commission.

Moreover, it is impossible for us to understand how the Soviet Union can contend that its entire defence system would be bared by inspection in a test ban treaty. If representatives will refer to article VIII, clause 5, of the comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58), they will see that it reads as follows:

"When a seismic event has been certified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Executive Officer shall designate an area lying within the circumference of a circle, the radius of which is ____ kilometres, and the centre of which is the location of the epicentre of that event."

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Now, the inspectors of the commission must go directly to the site so certified by the commission. The size of the area will be specified in the treaty. If the few inspections that would take place occurred only in areas in which seismic events have occurred in the past, then very little of the territory of the Soviet Union would be subject to inspection. And, since the inspection teams of the commission would be completely regulated by the host country in terms of travel -- they would travel on the host country's planes with the host country's pilots and the host country would determine the routes from the border to the site of the on-site inspection and would make any other arrangements, so long as they did not interfere with the actual scientific work of the inspection teams -- it is beyond the comprehension of my Government, or, I submit beyond that of any reasonable man, how the defence system of the Soviet Union could in any possible way be compromised or affected. I just do not see how the representative of the Soviet Union can say, as he did at the last plenary meeting, that the inspection teams would have "the right to penetrate without hindrance into the most secret places in the territories of States" (ENDC/PV.76, pp.15-16). It is clear from the passage which I have just read out from the treaty that that is a plain distortion of the terms of the treaty.

Finally, the Soviet representative argues that the United States position is not identical with the position outlined in the memorandum (ENDC/28) submitted on 16 April by the eight new members of this Conference. Well, each of the representatives here can examine the contents of the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58) and learn for himself the many aspects of the eight-Nation memorandum which have been incorporated in it. But I submit that, as the representatives of Brazil and of Sweden indicated this morning the last thing desired by the eight nations is to have their memorandum used, as the representative of Burma said, as a volley ball to be tossed back and forth from side to side (ENDC/PV.65, p.15).

I contend that the United Kingdom and the United States have taken that memorandum and have used it, as I believe its authors intended, in drafting an entire treaty. The representative of Ethiopia said on 19 April (ENDC/PV.24, p.5) that the memorandum was not a treaty, that its authors were not going to interpret it, but that they expected us to use it in working out a treaty. That is what they

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expected us to do, and we have done exactly that. I believe that the eight nations do not want us to argue any more about the contents of the eight nation memorandum, which we can all read for ourselves. What they want us to do is to negotiate. As the representative of Brazil said on a previous occasion, (ENDC/PV.71, pp.14-15) they do not want us to indulge in long speeches as a substitute for the long and hard work which awaits us if a treaty is to be signed in time to come into force before the end of this year. I am sure I echo the sentiments of the eight nations when I say that what they want is that the Soviet Union should stop arguing about this completely untenable point of on-site inspection, which I submit is a red herring, and work with us -- that is, the United Kingdom and the United States -- to reach agreement on a workable and effective nuclear test ban treaty.

The Soviet representative's statement on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76) implied still other arguments against the United Kingdom-United States draft comprehensive treaty (ENDC/58). He remarked rather critically on the treaty's provisions for some international supervision of the detection stations, on the role of the executive officer and on the role of the international scientific commission. It is true that the Soviet representative did not say explicitly that he was opposed to those provisions but, nevertheless, his remarks were on the critical side. But I would point out that those provisions are in many respects reasonable and normal to the functioning of most international organizations, and we do not understand, on any ordinary treaty-drafting basis, to what extent they cause problems for the Soviet Union. We would of course welcome further clarification on these points.

Also on 29 August the Soviet representative criticized too the draft treaty (ENDC/59) proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. What did he say? First he said that such a treaty would legalize underground testing. But if underground testing would be legalized under such a treaty then underground testing is legalized today, for the status of underground testing would be no different under a limited treaty not applying to underground testing than it is now. Underground testing would, unfortunately, only be exempt if the Soviet Union continued to refuse to accept a reasonable verification system under a comprehensive treaty which would

(Mr. Dean, United States)

ban all tests including underground tests, as the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed in document ENDC/58. I submit that the inclusion of some aspects of the arms race in an agreement does not necessarily affect all the other parts which are left out. The other parts must be included just as soon as agreement on them can be reached - in this case in the form of a comprehensive draft treaty.

Secondly, the Soviet representative argues against a limited treaty because he says it will not stop the arms race. The United States has never said that even a comprehensive test ban treaty would stop the arms race; we need a further treaty on general and complete disarmament to do that. But we do submit that either a comprehensive treaty or a limited treaty would be a major step towards the goal of stopping the arms race, and the arms race will not be stopped until we bring all kinds of weapons under reduction and control. The Soviet Union and the United States are pledged in the joint statement of agreed principles to "seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date" (ENDC/5, p.3). Does the Soviet Union not believe in that principle? Does it not want to achieve the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date? I submit that that is what agreement on a limited test ban treaty would do until the Soviet Union was willing to accept the reasonable comprehensive test ban treaty proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Thirdly, the Soviet representative argues that a limited treaty would not prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other States. No treaty, comprehensive or limited, will stop the spread of nuclear weapons if a non-party country is really determined to go ahead despite what the present nuclear Powers do; but a limited treaty would be a gain. Any demonstration of agreement in stopping tests by the nuclear Powers at this Conference would have a decided impact on other States. Moreover, once the nuclear Powers had agreed they would be in a strong position to persuade other parties to accede to the treaty; that is, to persuade other States to become parties to it. It is a certainty that the longer we delay the more likely it will be that other Powers will begin to test and produce their own nuclear weapons.

Fourthly, the Soviet representative implies that radioactive fall-out is not a matter for concern. Since when has that been the position of the Soviet Union?

(Mr. Dean, United States)

On 14 January 1960 Chairman Khrushchev expressed a contrary view. He said at that time that he favoured an agreement and stated that "people will feel confident that the atmosphere is not to be contaminated with radioactive fall-out." Fall-out, I submit, is a matter of concern to people everywhere and if we can act together to stop it we should do so. It does indeed surprise my delegation to note this new attitude on the part of the Soviet Union.

Fifthly, the Soviet representative suggests that in a partial treaty the United States could improve its weapons while the Soviet Union could not. Again I submit there is no truth in that argument. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have tested under ground. The United States has apparently tested more weapons underground than the Soviet Union, but this is only a matter of degree and it is only a matter of choice. The main reason the United States has tested underground is to limit fall-out.

The Soviet Union is currently testing in the atmosphere and apparently plans to continue, as it did last year when it tested bigger and bigger weapons. The Soviet Union began to test this year, and while there were several low yield tests in the low kiloton range prior to 5 August in Central Siberia, the first of the announced tests -- that is one detected by other stations -- was on 5 August at Novaya Zemlya. It was about 30 megatons. That was followed by:

7 August in central Siberia -- in the low kiloton range;
10 August in Novaya Zemlya -- less than 1 megaton;
20 August in Novaya Zemlya -- of the order of several megatons;
22 August in Novaya Zemlya -- in the low megaton range;
25 August in Novaya Zemlya -- of the order of several megatons;
25 August in Semipalatinsk -- of a low yield;
27 August in Novaya Zemlya -- of the order of several megatons.

I would draw attention to the fact that these are several days apart and that we can probably continue the announcement of further tests by the Soviet Union in the atmosphere; and, as I have said, as Soviet tests continued last year they increased in the number of megatons of yield. Underground testing, if it had to be exempt -- if we could not get agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty as we would hope -- would be open to all parties to the treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Those are the arguments put forward by the Soviet Union regarding the two treaties submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States in an effort to advance the work of our Conference. For the reasons stated we do not believe those arguments are valid and we have pointed out in each case why we believe they are not valid.

As a final point the Soviet representative suggests that a limited treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water be accepted, but that a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments be entered into at a later date. My Government is not only willing but anxious to agree to that procedure. It is exactly what we proposed on Monday, 27 August, (ENDC/PV.75) when we submitted our two drafts of treaties.

But our Governments, as the representative of the United Kingdom has pointed out, cannot agree to the other suggestion made by the Soviet representative that with respect to underground testing there be an understanding not to test or to refrain from testing in that environment. That procedure has been tried before, and I regret to say it did not work. No matter what term is used -- voluntary restraint, gentleman's agreement, exercise of voluntary control, or moratorium -- the United States just cannot accept such arrangements. We must know what the other fellow is doing. We are quite willing to bind ourselves, but we submit that the other fellow should be equally bound.

The United States first proposed a moratorium in 1958 for the purpose of stimulating and facilitating agreement. When President Eisenhower first proposed, on 22 August 1958, that the nuclear Powers negotiate an agreement to end all tests, based on the experts' report of 1958, he said:

"... in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations."

We were so reluctant to test that we stretched that one year on and on for almost three years until the Soviet Union itself began to test in the atmosphere in September 1961, despite Chairman Khrushchev's solemn words on 14 January 1960 to the contrary. It began to test in the atmosphere in September 1961, and it is testing in the atmosphere today.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States proposed and entered into a moratorium, therefore, as a means to facilitate agreement. Unfortunately we were proved wrong, and we will not be proved wrong again. We also proposed the moratorium because we had thought that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept effective verification for the ending of nuclear weapon tests. In that also we apparently were proved wrong. The two bases on which the United States agreed not to test pending the completion of an agreement were found to be completely illusory. The United States cannot now accept a moratorium which has been tried by us and which has failed so ignominiously.

It has been said that, whatever the risks, the United States must assume those risks in accepting an uninspected, unpoliced moratorium with respect to underground tests. Well, I do not know quite what the phrase "whatever the risks" means. The risks could be very great. We are quite prepared to accept the risks of an adequately policed comprehensive test ban treaty. We are quite prepared to accept the risks of not testing in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space without any international commission, but we are not prepared to accept the risks of an unpoliced, uninspected moratorium on underground testing. But the United States is prepared to negotiate fully, adequately and sincerely for a comprehensive test ban treaty or, if that cannot be negotiated, for a limited treaty as we have outlined.

Our time to reach agreement is running out. The United Kingdom and the United States, recognizing that, have made very far-reaching proposals to the Soviet Union. So far the Soviet Union has not moved one inch as a result.

President Kennedy also said at his Press Conference on Wednesday:

"Those who oppose an agreement should consider what our security will look like at the end of this decade if we do not have the agreement and we have the possibility of ten or fifteen countries having these weapons. And when one goes off, it may mean they all go off. So this Administration will leave no stone unturned to get an agreement, if we can get it, and provide for our security."

That is why, with the co-operation of our United Kingdom colleagues, we have proposed that the Sub-Committee on the test ban treaty should continue to work during the recess, and that we each should continue to negotiate on the basis of the two drafts of treaties which we have proposed to the Conference. That is the position of the United States and United Kingdom. We hope that it will also be the position of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) Today my delegation intends to make a statement on the questions referred to in item 5(c) of the agreed procedure of work on the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/52). Before doing so, I should like to make a few comments in connexion with the statements we have heard this morning.

We shall study the statements made by the representatives of Brazil and Sweden. They are of considerable interest for the consideration of the questions on the agenda. The Soviet delegation will also consider the joint proposal of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom that the three-Power Sub-Committee should continue its work while the Committee is in recess.

Now I should like to make one remark in connexion with Mr. Dean's statement. As regards the clarifications which Mr. Dean offered here in support of the two draft treaties that have been submitted (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59), I must say that these clarifications are not encouraging. They show once again that the United States is sticking to its previous position. The United States wants its draft treaties to be accepted unconditionally and is trying in every possible way to prove that these drafts are a very great step forward. The Soviet delegation has already stated its opinion in regard to them. Today's statement by Mr. Dean has confirmed once more that the United States is not prepared to negotiate on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28). The United States does not intend to seek for a compromise solution, as proposed by the non-aligned countries, a solution which would be acceptable to all parties. A number of delegations have spoken about such a compromise approach to the solution of the question of nuclear tests in the course of the discussions in the Committee. I may mention yesterday's statement by the representative of Nigeria (ENDC/PV.76) and the statement made today by the representative of Sweden who spoke about the memorandum as follows:

"We still feel that it" - that is, the memorandum - "provides not only a realistic but probably the only possible bridge for a compromise."

(supra, p.30)

I want to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union supports the memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned States and believes that on that basis we can soon reach agreement on the discontinuance of all tests in the atmosphere, in space, under water and underground.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Now I should like to deal with another question which was referred to by Mr. Dean, and also by Mr. Godber, in their statements. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have today made another attempt to saddle the Soviet Union with responsibility for the continuance of nuclear explosions. The United Kingdom representative repeated his old, far-fetched arguments which completely distort the whole picture of the negotiations and the position of the sides in carrying out test explosions.

On a number of occasions already the Soviet delegation has cited an exhaustive list of facts showing that the responsibility for beginning and continuing nuclear weapon testing rests not with the Soviet Union, but with the Western Powers, and primarily the United States. Since this subject is raised so persistently by our Western partners, I should like to cite some facts, although perhaps this may mean repeating to some extent what the Soviet delegation has stated on more than one occasion.

As long ago as March 1958 the Soviet Union, moved by the desire to facilitate the drafting of an international agreement on this question, unilaterally ceased nuclear weapons tests, although, as is well known, the number of test explosions carried out by the Soviet Union up to that date was several times less than the number carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom. How did the Governments of the United States and other Western Powers respond to that initiative by the Soviet Government?

When the Soviet Union unilaterally ceased the testing of its nuclear weapons in 1958, the United States responded with a series of experimental nuclear bomb explosions of unprecedented intensity.

During the whole course of the three-Power negotiations in Geneva, the United States refused to conclude a treaty which would have banned all nuclear weapons tests. Furthermore, while it was still negotiating, it continually threatened to resume testing.

I will recall once again the statement made on 29 December 1959 by Mr. Eisenhower, the former President of the United States, in which he said that the voluntary moratorium on testing would expire on 31 December, and that the United States considered itself free to resume nuclear weapon testing.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Thus the United States Government announced that it did not wish to adhere any longer to its voluntary undertaking in regard to nuclear tests.

Speaking on 21 November 1960 at the 268th meeting of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, gave the following explanations of the statement by President Eisenhower which I have mentioned above. This is what the United States representative said on this subject:

"We need to make no justification for the resumption of testing.

The President of the United States last December stated clearly that the United States did not consider itself bound any longer by a moratorium on testing and would be free to resume testing at any time we believe it to be in our national interest, subject only to a prior announcement."

(GEN/DNT/PV.268, p.24)

The Soviet Government, in its statement of 31 August 1961 on nuclear tests, made the following observation:

"Nor can the Soviet Government disregard the fact that the United States ally in NATO, France, has long been conducting nuclear tests. While the Soviet Union was refraining from nuclear tests and trying at the talks to reach agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on their discontinuance everywhere, France carried out explosions of nuclear devices one after the other. It is continuing to do so despite the appeal of the United Nations to all States to refrain from such tests, despite the protest of wide public circles in all the countries of the world and despite the Soviet Union's warnings that it will be compelled to resume testing, if France does not cease its experiments with nuclear weapons." (GEN/DNT/117, p.7)

In this connexion, it is not irrelevant to stress the aggressive character of NATO, although Mr. Dean tried to deny it today. What is needed in these matters is not mere words, but proof in the form of deeds. And the deeds show that the activities of this Organization are aimed at intensifying the arms race and preparing for a new war. In the same statement, the Soviet Government stressed that:

"The peoples are now witnessing the ever-increasing aggressiveness of the policy of the NATO military bloc. The United States of America and its allies are setting the fly wheel of their war machine going ever more

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intensively, whipping up the arms race to an unprecedented extent, increasing the strength of their armies and bringing to white heat the tension of the international situation. The matter has gone so far that the leaders of the United States and of the countries allied to it are resorting to threats to take up arms and unleash war in reply to steps taken by the Soviet Union with a view to improving the international situation. Faced with these facts, which cannot fail to cause alarm, the Soviet Union considers it to be its duty to take all the necessary measures so that the Soviet Union would be fully prepared to render harmless any aggressor, if he should attempt to carry out an attack." (ibid. p.1).

I think it is quite clear from what I have said that it is not the Soviet Union that is responsible for the continuance of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has been striving continuously and persistently, and it will go on striving, for the discontinuance of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, under water and underground as soon as possible.

Now I should like to pass on to item 5(c) of the agreed procedure of work on the first stage.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to make some additional comments on the question before the Committee, namely the reduction of conventional armaments and curtailment of their production in stage I.

As the exchange of views has shown, there are a number of points of contact between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States of America on this question; or at least one can say that we are close to one another in our understanding of certain aspects of the problem.

First, the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed, in the interests of reaching agreement as soon as possible, to accept the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments in stage I has created what one may describe as common ground for the solution of the problem. Both sides now base themselves on the principle that 30 per cent of tanks, armoured cars, armoured carriers, non-nuclear artillery systems, and so on must be destroyed in stage I; in other words, where conventional armaments are concerned, about one third of all the swords must be beaten into plough shares in stage I. It is true that in an age of inter-continental rockets and thermonuclear bombs tanks and artillery are far from being the most powerful strike weapons. Nevertheless, agreement between the

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USSR and the United States on the proportion by which weapons of this type should be reduced in stage I does have quite a positive significance.

Secondly, there can be noted a fairly wide area of agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments production, which is inseparably linked with the reduction of these armaments themselves. Both sides, it would seem, share the view that only a strictly limited production of conventional armaments - within the limits required for the replacement of weapons and military equipment which have become unserviceable under normal conditions - will be allowed to continue in stage I. The intention here is that unserviceable weapons may be replaced only by equipment of the same type, and that no new types are to be developed. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed themselves in favour of not permitting States to re-arm with new or improved types of weapons under the guise of replacing unserviceable weapons.

Both sides hold that from the beginning of the first stage the construction of new plant facilities for military production, and the expansion of the productive capacity of existing plant facilities, should be prohibited. Once States have begun to destroy their war machines in the first stage, there can be no question of any parts of the war machine being improved, expanded or consolidated.

The sides are also in agreement that in the second stage even more far-reaching steps should be taken to solve the problem of reducing the production of conventional armaments.

It goes without saying that these principles should be reflected in the text of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If this entails having to give greater precision to the existing wordings, it is hardly likely that this will involve any difficulty, since mutual understanding on the substance of the question appears to have been achieved.

Thirdly, as we see it, our positions are fairly close in regard to the establishment of strict international control over destruction of the armaments to be reduced in the first stage. Both sides base themselves on the principle that States will have to furnish the international disarmament commission with information on the quantity of conventional armaments to be destroyed by them in the first stage; inspectors of the international organization will have to be present at the places where the weapons are to be brought for destruction, and will supervise the

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actual process of their destruction. There do not appear to be any difference of opinion, either, in the respect that the transfer of suitable transport vehicles and auxiliary equipment to peaceful uses should also take place under careful supervision on the part of inspectors of the international organization.

Fourthly, both sides are on common ground in their treatment of provisions regarding control over a reduction in the production of conventional armaments in the first stage. Here too both sides, apparently, base themselves on the principle that States will have to furnish the international disarmament commission with information on all plant facilities for the production of conventional armaments which are subject to reduction in the first stage. Subsequently international inspectors will be able to inspect all factories or workshops which are being shut down in connexion with the reduction of production for military purposes.

How are we to assess the progress we have made in this way in the course of the discussions on the question of reducing conventional armaments and their production? Have we made much or little progress?

In this connexion we should like to draw the Committee's attention first of all to the following. This drawing together of the positions of the sides on the question of reducing nuclear armaments is taking place at a time when there is not only no sign of any progress in solving the most important problem, namely the elimination in stage I of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets and of all foreign military bases on alien territory, but every statement by the United States delegation shows that the United States is not seeking to bring the positions closer on this question. Take a look at the verbatim record of the previous meeting of the Committee. You have only to read the statement made by the United States representative at that meeting to be convinced of this. Over and over again attempts are being made to prove to the Committee that the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I is impossible.

Moreover, the United States representative has even tried to dispute the self-evident proposition that the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would, by the end of stage I, make it virtually impossible to unleash a nuclear war. He called that an "unsubstantiated assertion" (ENDC/PV.76 p. 8). How are we to assess this approach of the United States delegation to the question of the elimination of delivery vehicles?

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We realise that even if both sides approach the matter in the most conscientious manner possible, differences of opinion may arise in the course of the discussions in regard to particular details or specific aspects of the major disarmament problems. These differences can usually be ironed out in the course of negotiations, if all the participants are really interested in solving the problems under discussion. But how can we make any progress, if one of the sides does not even wish to hear about the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I? One cannot even describe that as a difference of opinion; just as one cannot describe as a difference of opinion a situation where, for example, one side, according to the rules of arithmetic, says that twice two makes four, and the other side asserts that twice two makes a wax candle.

The trouble here, of course, is not that the Western Powers fail to understand something, or that the question is not yet sufficiently clear, but simply that they do not want to part with the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. They want to keep them, and thereby retain the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war.

Today the United Kingdom representative once again put forward the far-fetched argument against the Soviet proposals regarding delivery vehicles that the civilian aircraft remaining at the disposal of States after the elimination of delivery vehicles could be used for carrying nuclear bombs. The Soviet Union has no intention of doing this. But if the Western Powers are really concerned about this possibility and if this prevents them from accepting the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, then the Soviet Union is prepared to meet them half-way.

In this connexion I should like to remind the Committee that on 10 July 1962 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, made the following statement on this question:

"It is said that nuclear weapons can also be carried in TV-114s, Boeing 707s and other civil aircraft. But if there is a real desire for disarmament, the various countries may for a while keep their means of defence - anti-aircraft artillery, and air defence rockets and fighters. Modern means of warfare make it possible to shoot down any aircraft flying at any altitude. As you see, the argument is thoroughly untenable." (ENDC/47, pp. 10-11)

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Why did we decide to focus attention on the question of the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage as one of the central points in our negotiations? Because the peoples of all the States of the world, Western and Eastern, large and small, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not, have only one desire and that is to remove as quickly as possible the threat of a thermonuclear war which is hanging like a thundercloud over mankind. It is the duty of all governments to meet the hopes and expectations of millions of people and to work out and agree on measures the implementation of which would really give mankind the chance to heave a sigh of relief, to be freed from anxiety about the future and to be rid of the nightmarish prospect of whole countries being turned into radioactive deserts.

How can this be done?

The most realistic approach to the solution of this question in the conditions existing today in the world is to reach agreement to destroy in the first stage of disarmament all devices and mechanisms, including rockets, aircraft and submarines, intended for delivering nuclear bombs and rockets to the selected targets of nuclear strikes, for delivering these weapons of death and devastation to their targets. This is why the Soviet Government proposes that we start disarmament with the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We regret that the United States and other Western Powers refuse to adopt a position in harmony with the spirit of the times on this crucial question.

One meeting after another passes, yet nothing of an encouraging nature appears in the position of the United States in regard to yet another most important question of the first stage - the question of the elimination of all foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom. Moreover, the United States delegation carefully avoids even to touch upon this question as though it were some kind of 'taboo' to the United States. At the previous meeting of the Committee, the United States representative solemnly declared that:

"For our part, we are prepared to respond to any serious and straightforward questions which the Soviet delegation may wish to ask about our proposals."

(ENDC/PV.76, p.13)

Yet we have repeatedly asked the United States delegation whether the United States intended to propose any measures for the dismantling of foreign military bases on

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alien territory in the first stage. We asked for clarification as to whether the United States had any intention of doing away with foreign military bases on alien territory and how it proposed to do so. But we have received no reply to any of these questions. Perhaps the United States delegation regards them as insufficiently serious or straightforward?

Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that even on the question of reducing conventional armaments and their production, despite the existence of a number of points on which our positions are substantially close, there are still certain divergencies. This applies above all to the question whether the 30 per cent reduction should be extended to all types of conventional armaments or whether this reduction should cover only certain of weapons of conventional type, leaving States free to increase the remaining conventional armaments. To tell the truth, we had hoped that on this question the United States delegation would show itself prepared to bring our respective positions closer. After all, the question is perfectly clear and involves no difficulties. However, we do not see any readiness on the part of our Western partners in the negotiations to pay heed to convincing arguments and to adopt a constructive position on this question. On the contrary, the United States representative again and again repeats the selfsame, essentially far-fetched arguments against extending the 30 per cent reduction to all types of armaments.

There is also something else that has caused us concern. In dealing with the question of control over the reduction of conventional armaments, the United States representative has once again put in the foreground the demand for the introduction of selective zonal inspection. At previous meetings we have explained in detail the reasons why selective zonal inspection cannot be accepted as a basis for agreement on control questions. Enough has been said here to show why it was impossible to agree to the opening up of the territory of States at the beginning of the disarmament process. Many facts have been adduced showing that the time is not ripe for this. It has been shown that the proposal for selective zonal inspection, which envisages actually the opening up of one third - roughly 7 million square kilometres - of Soviet territory in the very first stage of disarmament, is obviously aimed at giving NATO intelligence agencies legal access to the defensive system of the Soviet Union. This demand, the purpose of which is to impair the security of the Soviet Union, is contrary to point 5 of the agreed principles for

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disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5). Is it still not clear enough that in regard to the first stage it is impossible on this basis to reach agreement on control questions, including control over the reduction of conventional armaments?

However, the United States delegation ignores arguments, no matter how convincing they may be, and continues to insist on its proposal for selective zonal inspection, and thereby, of course, it deprives the Committee of the possibility of making progress.

Certain other aspects of the United States' position and the question of reducing conventional armaments and their production also militate against our reaching agreement. For instance, we asked for clarifications as to how the United States delegation envisages the future of those military plants which cease military production in the first stage. In the United States outline (ENDC/30) and also in the amendments to it submitted by the United States on 6 August (ENDC/30/Add.1), nothing is said about this, although it is obvious that all such plants must be eliminated or converted to peaceful production. However, we have received no reply to this question either; the United States delegation remains silent.

In the light of all that has been said, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to repeat once again that the Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate in eliminating the remaining differences on the question of reducing conventional armaments and their production in the first stage. We continue to think that it should be possible ultimately to reach agreement on this question. But, as we have now seen, the drawing together of the respective positions on this question is not having very much influence on the general situation in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, since no progress has been achieved on the main question of the first stage, namely the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of military forces therefrom. On these major questions it is now the turn of the United States and the other Western Powers to speak.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): It is now past one o'clock. May I suggest that this is a convenient moment for a break. We still have six speakers on the list and, in accordance with our earlier understanding this morning, it might be best for us to adjourn now for lunch and resume at 3.30 p.m., if that is acceptable to the Committee.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has no objection to the Committee finding ways and means to provide additional time in order to hear all the representatives who would like to speak.

As regards the practical side, the Soviet delegation would like to state its views. It seems to us that it would be better not to meet this afternoon, since today's schedule has already been drawn up beforehand and an afternoon meeting would upset many previous arrangements. I can also foresee that tomorrow, being Saturday, would not be quite convenient for some delegations, since, here again, certain engagements have been made and agreed upon. It might therefore be advisable to consider the alternative of finding this additional time on Monday. I should like to submit this suggestion to the Committee.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): As far as my delegation is concerned, we should be happy to meet this afternoon or, if that were not convenient, this evening. In general I agree that we ought to give those who have notified their desire to speak the opportunity to be heard. I regret that I have planned some rather intensive work in connexion with the conclusion of the Conference for both Saturday and Sunday, so that tomorrow morning would be most inconvenient for my delegation. I realize it is difficult for all representatives to be on time in the morning, but if we could all agree to be in our seats by five minutes to ten on Monday, and then to hold another meeting Monday afternoon if necessary, perhaps we could accommodate those representatives in that way.

I think there is a great deal of merit in what my Soviet colleague says about scheduling meetings, but my delegation would, within reason, be very happy to agree to afternoon or evening meetings. Although we originally scheduled our meetings to commence at 10 a.m., I am afraid we have slipped into the rather unfortunate habit of not arriving here until about 10.25 a.m., so that we really do not start until about half an hour later than our scheduled time.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I agree with the United States representative that we should be more punctual in beginning our meetings, and I do not think that anyone will object. We would not have any objection either to our meeting a little more frequently so as to be able to discuss

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the questions before us. But I think that two meetings on the same day would involve difficulties, especially if the second meeting had not been scheduled beforehand. There must be other possibilities of carrying on our work without having two meetings a day, which seems to me to be a somewhat overloaded programme. Instead of having a meeting on Monday afternoon, could we not have one on Tuesday morning? In that way we would have a rather more balanced schedule of work and that would enable us also to prepare better the subjects to be dealt with.

I think therefore that it would be preferable to have a meeting on Tuesday morning rather than on Monday afternoon in order to hear the speakers whose names are on the list but have not yet had an opportunity to speak. Furthermore, we should arrange for our work to be carried on next week in such a way as to enable us to complete the discussion on the questions under consideration.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I have listened to the remarks of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and Bulgaria and I would say, first of all, that I heartily endorse what they have said regarding an earlier start to our meetings. This morning we started at 10.20 and each speaker so far has taken, on the average, thirty minutes. So we would not get more than one extra speaker by starting at ten o'clock, desirable as that is. We have six speakers left on today's list. We have been told by some of the representatives that they have arrangements scheduled for this afternoon. Of course, the Canadian delegation would be reluctant to interfere with any other important duties, but we do feel that the importance of hearing those representatives who wish to speak on this matter and of getting their views on record should perhaps come before any other matters which may engage the attention of delegations.

As far as I know, neither the Sub-Committee nor the co-Chairmen have scheduled a meeting for this afternoon. As for the suggestion that, instead of meeting twice a day in order to give everybody an opportunity to speak, we should meet every day, as the representative of Bulgaria suggested, we feel that it would be preferable for the Conference to hold two meetings in one day. The reason for that is that, in order to be able to reply properly to some of the statements that have been made, it is desirable to have the verbatim records before us. Subject to the opinion of the Secretariat on that possibility, we believe that the intervening days -- such as

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we have had since the resumption of our work on 16 July -- could be used for study and for preparation of our statements. Therefore, the Canadian delegation favours holding two meetings a day on the three days of the week rather than meeting every day of the week. Of course, we are willing to accommodate ourselves to the views of the Committee as a whole. We presume, however, that if the Committee decides not to hold another meeting before Monday, 3 September, those whose names are on the list at present and who have not had an opportunity to speak today will be called on to speak in that order on Monday.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): As far as I am concerned I should be quite happy to have a meeting this afternoon, but if other representatives feel that they would prefer not to meet until Monday, I would have no objection. I only wish to point out that I shall be leaving for New York on Monday -- although sufficiently late in the day to permit me to make a statement here, provided I can make it fairly soon after we begin. I think that, as things stand, I am second on the list -- or will be if Mr. Burns' proposal is adopted. On that basis I think that I could catch my plane and make a statement as well.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I take it that it is the consensus that we should adjourn now and meet again on Monday, 3 September, at 10 o'clock sharp. In the light of Monday's events we can see whether a discussion about the number of our meetings is considered necessary. Is that acceptable to the Committee?

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I am sorry, but I am not quite clear about the position. I understand your feeling, Mr. Chairman, that it is the general wish that we should not meet again until Monday morning, but I am not clear whether you anticipated that we would meet Monday morning and afternoon. We ought to know in advance; otherwise, people will say that they have engagements for Monday afternoon and we shall have the same problem once again. I think that, for the benefit of us all, we ought to clarify the position before we leave now. I would suggest that we do agree to meetings morning and afternoon on Monday, which would seem to meet the general view of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I take it that we accept tentatively that it is the wish of the Committee to hold two meetings on Monday, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, and that we shall decide upon the basis of the progress of our work what we should do on other days.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-seventh plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mbu, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The United Kingdom delegation tabled a paper^{*/} on the technical possibility of international control of fissile material production.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 3 September 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

